When Moulay Hicham Recycles His Theoretical Ideas
It’s no surprise to see Prince Moulay Hicham revisiting old themes with his new book, Islam and Democracy – How to Change the Face of the Arab World. The same rhetoric is at play, attempting to revive the outdated idea of an alliance between political Islam and radical left-wing ideologies that resist change. However, the recent experiences of Arab Spring movements demonstrate the disastrous outcomes of such theories, which often unite extremes under the guise of revolutionary principles. The consequences? Civil wars, economic disasters, and societal regressions.
To justify the failure of the so-called Arab Spring—which he himself admits ended in collapse—Moulay Hicham describes it as part of a long-term process, akin to European revolutions of the past. Yet, the regimes that emerged from these uprisings 15 years ago have universally failed, imposing authoritarian rule, institutional coups, and chaos that pushed states into turmoil. Even nostalgic views of previous autocracies seem preferable to the ensuing disorder.
How, then, does he continue to present Tunisia as a “laboratory of the Arab world” while it endures one of the worst phases in its history, led by a reckless tyrant? Tunisia now appears to function as a satellite of militarized Algeria. What about the “structural factors” that supposedly encourage democratization—such as the nature of the state, civil society vitality, and economic resources? His arguments conveniently overlook Kais Saied’s blunders, who now stands as a puppet of Algerian generals, notorious for regional repression.
Moulay Hicham goes on to introduce the concept of “country-specific parameters” during his RFI interview. Ironically, this is the same person who, 15 years ago, criticized the idea of “variable-geometry democracy.” Such intellectual inconsistency and lack of good faith are evident.
As for the Moroccan 20 February Movement (M20F), which Moulay Hicham deems insufficiently revolutionary, he alleges that the monarchy responded too quickly to its demands. This assertion couldn’t be further from the truth. Everyone knows the M20F was a diverse coalition of citizens ranging from leftists to Islamists who hesitated at opening society. No coherent list of demands was ever presented, and the constitutional reform under King Mohammed VI stemmed from national initiatives—not the fragmented demands of an unpredictable coalition. The monarchy’s reform efforts over the past quarter-century remain unparalleled in the region.
In another contradiction, Moulay Hicham relegates his M20F allies to mere “observers without a real political presence on the ground.” How, then, could they have formulated demands that were supposedly ignored by the monarchy?
Finally, he dares to suggest that his book revives outdated and worn-out theories. Such pretentiousness! His claims only highlight the intellectual shallowness of his discourse.