What’s the Algerian System?

Ask any seasoned insider in Algiers about the Algerian regime, and they will tell you the same cryptic warning: “Whoever claims to know the Algerian regime is lying to you. If someone insists they understand its inner workings, rest assured that they are misleading you, either out of ignorance or deliberate deceit”. The Algerian system is a labyrinthine construct, a political matryoshka doll with an infinite number of layers. Like a Russian doll within a doll, no matter how much one pushes, the system always has a reserve tank, an extra layer of resilience. It possesses -or wants you to believe it possesses- an almost supernatural ability to sustain long and grueling marathons of power struggles, always keeping something hidden beneath each layer, ensuring that even the deepest dive never reaches the bottom. Each time one is peeled away, another remains, reinforcing the illusion of an eventual breakthrough. But there is no final layer, only another contingency, another fallback, another deception.

The regime’s resilience does not stem from ideological brilliance or exceptional governance. It thrives on survival tactics: active measures, strategic deflection, obscuring transparency, and extreme pragmatism. It functions as an entity designed to evade capture, dissection, and accountability. It has mastered the art of active measures and deflection, keeping things under the radar, avoiding labels and constructs, and clouding granular understanding, judgment, and vision. This intentional obfuscation ensures that tangible comprehension remains elusive, reinforcing the illusion that the system is unknowable. The more one tries to penetrate its structure, the more elusive it becomes. The whole state apparatus has built and adapted towards serving that, and there are individuals within the state offices whose full-time job is to contribute to that.

The system’s roots lie in Algeria’s war of independence, a struggle that granted the newly formed state an unparalleled level of international legitimacy. The revolution’s glory was undeniable; it positioned Algeria as a role-model and a beacon for anti-colonial movements worldwide. This was not due to the genius of any leader or political strategist, it was the cause itself that resonated with global audiences. The Cold War, Arab nationalism, and the non-aligned movement provided a stage where Algeria could shine. A distinction however must be made: it was the cause, not the ideology, that conferred legitimacy. It was not the brilliance of the state, the regime, or any particular leader that elevated Algeria’s standing, it was the powerful, circumstantial cause of the time that made it so.

The position granted through the legitimacy of the cause allowed Algeria to play key roles in the global order. Algeria itself supported other just causes and struggles and causes in South-Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and other, owing it the name of the Mecca of revolutionaries. It became a crucial bridge in hostage crises between the East and West, mediating between the Middle East and the United States. During this time, military regime absorbed, like osmosis, the teachings of statecraft in a rapidly changing world where Cold War politics, anti-colonial struggles, and revolutionary movements were shaping international dynamics.

With time, the Algerian regime mutated. Initially modeled on KGB-Soviet principles by Abdelhafid Boussouf, it absorbed influences from Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Maoist China. This foundation allowed it to navigate Cold War geopolitics with precision and clarity. But by the 1990s, after the Black Decade of civil war, it had degenerated into something else entirely, a Franco-Mussolini-style fascist-mafiosi entity under Mohamed Mediene. It became held together not by revolutionary ideals but by brute force and money. The post-independence era, once guided by KGB/Yugoslav-style governance, evolved into a militarized, corporatized system that sacralized the revolutionary cause for its own benefit rather than for national progress. Those who seized power after the revolts of 1988, the civil war of the 1990s, and the 2019 white coup against Bouteflika proved that the ultimate power holder in Algeria is not an individual, ideology, or party, it is whoever controls the weapons and the cash flow.

At its core, the Algerian system is anchored by three fundamental pillars which constitute it and which we call the 3 pillars of the Algerian military regime: 1) Cash from gas and oil and illicit trafficking guaranteeing the regime’s lifeline and bargaining chip, 2) Weapons (hard conventional weapons such as tanks and guns, but also state TV, bureaucracy are also weapons), and 3) KGB-Mafia-Thug tactics, a ruthless mix of espionage, intimidation, organized crime and state-terrorism methodologies.

From 1999 to 2019, were 20 years of a lighter Houari Boumediene era, or a Houari Boumediene 2.0 era under Abdelaziz Bouteflika where Algeria was stable and relatively better from other contrasting moments. But the crises of 1988, 1992, 2001, and 2019, 2021 and 2024-2025, progressively laid bare the système and its absolute nature. It proved that the regime doesn’t care about diplomacy, economic reform, or social policies, as those are secondary or entirely irrelevant. The regime is not bound by alliances, principles, or ideological commitments. It will become whatever it needs to be to survive. It has no friends, only interests. It will side with China, Russia, the U.S., Iran, France, Syria, NATO, and even Israel depending on what best secures its three pillars. If a relationship threatens any of these, it will be severed without hesitation.

This is the reason why the Algerian system is absolutely doing everything in its possibility to parasite, silence, assassinate, annihilate journalists who describe and talk about its fundamental nature: Hichem Aboud, Amir Boukhors, Anouar Malek, Ferhat Mehenni, Kamel Daoud, Boualem Sansal, Khaled Drareni, Ihsane El Kadi, Karim Tabou, Fodhil Boumala, Mohammed Tadjadit, and others isolated or assassinated: Messali Hadj, Abane Ramdane, Mohamed Khider, Ali Mecili, Kasdi Merbah, Mohamed Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed, Taleb Ibrahimi, Lakhdar Bouregaa etc. These individuals, fundamentally lay bare the nature of the system. The regime is less parasitic and obsessed about others such as Abdou Semmar, Mohamed Larbi Zitout, Said Bensdira, Sofiane Djilali, Louisa Hanoune and the likes, because they serve the holy triad of the military regime.

Since 2021, when Chafik Mesbah’s counter-insurgency and counter-revolutionary legal framework was adopted by Presidential executive order, Algeria underwent a full transformation into a thug-state, where ideological façades became mere relics, and governance was dictated by brute force and strategic opportunism. By October 2024, following France’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara,an implicit dismissal of Algeria’s geopolitical ambitions,and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, the Algerian regime found itself in the weakest position since its inception in 1957, stripped bare before public scrutiny.

Its long-standing reliance on Russia and Syria was no longer hidden in the shadows; the regime’s strategic dependencies were now fully exposed. War crimes committed by key military figures such as Mohamed Mediene, Abdelkader Haddad, and Saïd Chengriha were brought to light, its diplomatic passport scandal revealed, further eroding any remaining legitimacy. In response, the regime lashed out a full-blow hybrid warfare campaign against France, while simultaneously flirting with normalization with Israel and hiring Israeli lobby firms in Washington D.C. It dramatically increased its military annual budget to $25b, secured additional arms deals with Russia, expanded gas and oil contracts with U.S. energy firms, and granted NATO access to critical infrastructure security contracts. It continued leveraging financial resources to buy diplomatic influence in international forums, reinforcing its survival strategy through calculated geopolitical maneuvering rather than substantive governance. And this is exactly the point: the bare naked nature of the algerian system is 1) cash 2) weapons 3) KGB-mafia-terrorist tactics.

The Great Illusion of Algerian Politics

Many mistakenly believe the Algerian system operates like a traditional dictatorship, with a singular strongman controlling all levers of power. This is a fallacy. The reality is far more complex and cynical. Power does not reside in one person but is instead a network of competing interests and loyalties; often between the military, the intelligence and sometimes the executive. These constantly shift and change based on circumstances to preserve the system itself. Presidents come and go, but the system remains. The real power lies within those who control 1) gas and trafficking cash revenues, 2) weapons (conventional arms, media, and bureaucracy), 3) loyal network of KGB-mafia-terrorist-thugs.

Those who believe they can decode the regime through political analysis alone will always fail. What happens on the surface, elections, reforms, crises, are mere distractions, orchestrated narratives meant to mislead both the population and international observers. The real regime exists in the shadows, adjusting its tactics and the facades, while maintaining the same fundamental structure.

The biggest mistake observers make is believing the regime is driven by political views, principles, or ideology. They assume Algeria’s rulers are dedicated to anti-colonial struggle, pan-Arabism, socialist justice, or by some political culture that is different. Nothing could be further from the truth. These are convenient illusions used to distract diverse audiences. If tomorrow, embracing capitalism, liberal democracy, monarchy, dropping Polisario support, or normalizing with Israel ensured the continuation of the system’s core structure, it would do so without hesitation.

In 2019, the regime executed a coup against Bouteflika, using the legitimate grievances of the Hirak protests to stage yet another power reshuffling. The same generals who ruled from the shadows simply rebranded themselves claiming they are against the “3issaba”, flipping the crisis into an opportunity to reset their grip on power. On December 23, 2019 a radical strategic shift happened with the assassination of Ahmed Gaid Salah by Mohamed Mediene and Nezzar associates, eventually guaranteeing them a red carpet return in the state-affairs. They are now the true holders of the power in Algeria, because they are the ones who leveraged their 1) loyal network of KGB-mafia-terrorist-thugs to assassinate Ahmed Gaid Salah and insure a placement of individuals, slowly like a chess play placing individuals as paws, while jailing and assassinating the rivals, this was the purge Saïd Chengriha started since 2020 jailing which peaks today with more than 60 generals in military jail. The 2019 white-coup was not about democracy or reform, it was a recalibration to ensure long-term survival.

Understanding the Difference

So, can one truly know the Algerian system? No. Not in the way one understands Western political institutions or even other authoritarian regimes. The Algerian system is not a dictatorship, not a democracy, not a military junta, it is a network of individuals swimming in an environment that has a culture. That culture values very tangible pragmatic power elements: 1) cash from gas and trafficking, 2) weapons (conventional firearms, media, and bureaucracy), and 3) a network of loyal KGB-mafia-terrorist-thugs. It reinvents itself continuously, rewriting history, controlling narratives, and deploying new faces when necessary. He who understands this principle will not be fooled. He who understands this principle can predict the next move of the regime and won’t be misled.

On the other hand, those who believe in alternative explanations will be deceived. Those who attempt to predict its next move without understanding its core principles will be led astray. Those who think they can reform it from within are doomed to fail. The fall of the Algerian Military Regime requires three conditions:

• Financial Collapse or a Well-Funded Adversary, either the regime runs out of cash, or it faces an opponent with equal or greater financial resources.
• Disarmament or Counterforce, either the regime is stripped of its weapons, or it is confronted by an adversary with equal or superior power,whether military, media, or bureaucratic.
• Strategic Opposition and Counter-Intelligence, a cadre of loyal, sincere, and intelligent individuals who deeply understand the psychology of a KGB-mafia-terrorist-thug apparatus and can act decisively against it, using successful counter-intelligence tactics and strategies applied in countering Russian vassal states: Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Ukraine.

The Algerian regime is not a government; it is an environment and a culture of a self-sustaining system, a survival mechanism built on: 1) Cash from gas exports and illicit trafficking, 2) Weapons (Conventional firepower, media manipulation, and bureaucratic coercion), 3) Loyal Networks of KGB-mafia-terrorist-thugs. That is its ultimate truth and nature of the Algerian system.

Abderrahmane Fares ✍️