What Denmark and Greenland Teach Us About Algeria and Kabylia

Yesterday, Greenlanders cast their votes in a highly anticipated parliamentary election that saw the pro-business Demokraatit party secure a decisive victory with 29.9% of the votes, surpassing the pro-independence Naleraq party, which came in second at 24.5%. The election results marked a shift toward a more gradualist approach to independence, with the ruling Inuit Ataqatigiit party and its coalition partner suffering significant losses. This followed U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated assertions that Greenland is vital to American security interests and his pledge to bring the Arctic territory under U.S. control, a move widely rejected by Greenland’s political leaders and population. Trump’s rhetoric had thrust Greenland into the geopolitical spotlight, fueling debates over sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and the role of external powers in the island’s future.

The Danish Approach

Denmark, like any state with territorial dependencies, could have viewed Greenland’s independence aspirations as a direct threat to its national interests. Instead, it has taken a pragmatic and measured approach, acknowledging the right of Greenlanders to decide their own future.

Rather than crushing the independence movement, Copenhagen allowed Greenland to establish self-rule in 1979, then expanded its autonomy in 2009 with a law that explicitly grants the island the right to declare full independence via referendum. Even now, as Greenland’s political landscape shifts toward greater sovereignty, Denmark has not resorted to military crackdowns or legal maneuvers to block the process.

Denmark’s handling of Greenland is not the only one who has managed secessionist movements with legitimacy rather than brute force, other countries have done previously, the most recent ones were:

• Catalonia (Spain, 2017): While the Spanish government opposed Catalan independence, it allowed a referendum to take place, even if later deemed unconstitutional. The Catalan leaders faced legal consequences, but the dispute remained largely within the judicial and political arenas.
• Brexit (UK, 2016): The United Kingdom, rather than dismissing the idea of leaving the European Union as treasonous, put the decision to a national vote. The outcome, regardless of its long-term consequences, was respected by the state.
• Scotland (UK, 2014, and likely again soon): When Scotland sought to leave the UK, London didn’t send in troops, it allowed a referendum. The result was close, but the legitimacy of the process ensured political stability.

The lesson is simple: a state confident in its governance does not fear self-determination. Denmark knows that if Greenlanders choose to stay, it will be because they see value in their relationship with Denmark, not because they were forced to remain. The UK, Spain, and even Canada (with Quebec) have all recognized that the best way to neutralize separatist grievances is to give people the right to choose.

Why The Military Regime of Algiers Needs the MAK

In contrast, the Algerian military junta, like all insecure fascist authoritarian regimes, knows that its hold on power is so fragile that it cannot allow any real choice. Whether it is Kabylie’s autonomy, the Hirak movement’s calls for democracy, or even basic free expression, even an elderly writer with cancer, the response is always the same: repression.

And this is why the MAK (Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia) is gaining legitimacy now more than ever. Part of this legitimacy comes from popular support, while another part stems from its contested status, which keeps it in a constant state of tension. By labeling it a terrorist organization, a classification that the U.S. State Department has deemed political rather than based on actual terrorist activity, stating, “The United States considers Algeria’s concentration on these groups [i.e, Rachad and MAK] to be more political than security related, and neither appears to have committed what the United States defines as terrorist acts”, the fascist military regime of Algiers, through the repressive legal and counter-insurgency framework designed by Chafik Mesbah since 2021, is keeping the MAK in a strategic limbo, neither fully recognized nor eradicated. And that’s precisely the point: the regime doesn’t want the MAK to gain full legitimacy, but neither does it want the movement to disappear.

If the Algerian junta were to allow a vote on Kabylie’s independence, two scenarios could unfold:

• Either the MAK wins, and the regime suffers a humiliating rejection by the Kabyles – and by extension by the Algerians-,
• Or the MAK does not win, which would effectively dissolve the independence movement, and the regime would no longer have a convenient scapegoat to justify its repression.

Either way, it would be a lose-lose situation for the military rulers. Without the MAK, there would be no convenient bogeyman to justify repression. No specter of separatism to rally the state’s brutal security apparatus. No excuse to sustain a state of emergency and suppress broader democratic movements.

And this is why the fascist military regime of Algiers needs the MAK to exist in its current form, stigmatized, feared, and labeled as a terrorist organization. It justifies continued crackdowns, solidifies military rule, and ensures that Algeria remains in a permanent state of authoritarian stagnation.

Abderrahmane Fares ✍️