Kuwait Airways 1988 hostage crisis in Algiers

On December 6, 2024, the U.S. Department of State released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa. This volume, part of an archival series documenting the Reagan administration’s foreign policy, provides a detailed account of U.S. diplomatic activities and decisions in North Africa. It offers insight into the Reagan administration’s approaches to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Western Sahara, drawing upon primary sources such as cable traffic between U.S. diplomatic posts and the Department of State, memoranda among key officials, and U.S. intelligence analyses. The volume’s documents and commentary present a “thorough, accurate, and reliable record” of the period.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa
Available on the US State Department website

The 1988 Kuwait Airways Hijacking in Algiers

Among the significant events covered is the April 1988 hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight KU-422 (the Boeing 747 Jaberiyah) en route from Bangkok to Kuwait City. The hijacking lasted 15 days, making it the third-longest in history after the 1970 Zarca hijacking in Jordan (24 days) and the 1985 TWA Flight 847 hijacking in Beirut (17 days).

The incident began on April 5, 1988, when hijackers, later identified as Hezbollah operatives loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini, took control of the aircraft. They first landed in Mashhad, Iran, releasing 57 passengers. They then diverted to Larnaca, Cyprus, where two Kuwaiti passengers were killed after failed refueling negotiations, although 12 more hostages were subsequently freed. On April 13, the plane landed in Algiers, where 31 remaining hostages were held aboard under intense international scrutiny. The hijackers demanded the release of 17 prisoners held in Kuwait for involvement in the 1983 bombings of U.S. and French embassies. Algeria’s eventual decision to grant the hijackers safe passage in exchange for the hostages’ freedom sparked widespread criticism, particularly from the United States, which viewed the move as undermining counterterrorism efforts.

Confirmation of Aboud’s Account

Hichem Aboud, via his YouTube channel, provided a firsthand look into the hijacking’s aftermath. He recounted the intense diplomatic pressure the United States exerted on Algeria, the exhaustive questioning by American authorities, and his own role in arranging the hijackers’ departure under diplomatic cover. According to Aboud, he secured Algerian diplomatic passports and personally escorted the hijackers to Lebanon following the hostages’ release.

Hichem Aboud has provided a detailed account of the hijacking of Kuwait Airways Boeing 747, flight KU-422, in this video

In his video, Hichem Aboud returns to several key points, illustrating Algeria’s position at the time and its own role in the operation:

• He asserts that, at the time, Algeria, in the midst of an international crisis, was facing the sustained attention of major powers, including the United States.
• Aboud underlines the steadfastness of Algerian officials, such as General Lakhal Ayat and Commander Hadj Mohammed Tahar Abdesslam, who refused to comply fully with American injunctions, notably by rejecting an extremely detailed CIA questionnaire concerning the identity and physical characteristics of the hijackers.
• He refers to having, with the agreement of his superior General Lakhal Ayat, responded evasively to American requests, thus demonstrating Algeria’s determination to preserve its sovereignty and not submit to Washington’s demands.
• Aboud also reveals that he facilitated the discreet exit of the hijackers from a secret villa in Saint Eugène, accompanying them under assumed identities and diplomatic passports to Lebanon, although the world was kept in the dark.
• According to Aboud, these actions, carried out in a context of extreme tension, illustrate Algeria’s past international stature, capable at the time of standing up to the great powers, in contrast to what he perceives as a further weakening of Algerian authority and influence in 2024.

Before the December 6, 2024, publication of newly declassified U.S. diplomatic cables, Aboud’s claims remained largely unsubstantiated. With these documents now available, his account has gained substantial corroboration. The telegrams and records not only confirm Aboud’s narrative but also shed light on the concealed negotiations and strategic decisions that influenced the Reagan administration’s response. In doing so, the archives deepen our understanding of the complex geopolitical context in which Algeria operated, ultimately reshaping our understanding of this pivotal historical event.

The declassified archives made available confirm many of the elements put forward by Aboud. The diplomatic telegrams from the U.S. Department of State corroborate:

• The pressure exerted by the United States on Algeria,
• The meticulous and intrusive nature of the questionnaires provided by the American authorities, firmly refused by Algerian officials,
• Algeria’s decision to grant safe passage to the hostage-takers, facilitated by Aboud himself, who obtained diplomatic passports and escorted the hijackers to Lebanon.

How Did Algeria Handle the Crisis amidst the Immense Pressure Exerted on Algeria ?

The telegrams from the U.S. archives reveal a complex dynamic during the Kuwait Airways Flight 422 hijacking: the United States exerted intense pressure on Algeria to take decisive action, yet Algeria resisted fully aligning with American demands. This tension is evident in major media coverage at the time, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Le Monde, all of which noted Algeria’s refusal to cooperate as the U.S. desired. Publicly, Secretary of State George P. Shultz condemned Algeria’s handling of the crisis and demanded extradition of the hijackers. Simultaneously, the U.S. Department of State and the CIA pressed relentlessly for answers, demonstrating the high stakes and the intensity of international scrutiny.

Algeria’s response to this pressure was to maintain a stance guided by its own interests, particularly its regional relationships (including those with Hezbollah), rather than cede fully to Washington’s agenda. The unfolding situation thus created a difficult diplomatic environment in which Algeria’s actions drew global attention and criticism, forcing it to balance competing international interests under severe American displeasure.

Prioritizing Hostage Safety over Apprehending Hijackers:
Despite U.S. demands that the hijackers face justice, Algeria chose to secure the safe release of all hostages in exchange for allowing the hijackers to go free. Telegram 176 illustrates that General Lakehal Ayat, a key Algerian official, considered U.S. policy “ill-advised” and rejected the notion that capturing the hijackers should be equally prioritized with protecting the hostages. He emphasized that hostages’ safety was paramount and actively involved himself in the negotiations, briefing the U.S. ambassador and a likely CIA Chief of Station on the situation at 1500 local time on April 14. Algeria’s stance demonstrated a determination to resolve the crisis on its own terms, focusing on minimizing immediate harm over seeking retribution.

Rejecting the U.S. Stance Against Negotiating with Terrorists:

Telegram 177 further underscores this divergence. After the U.S. ambassador reiterated the American stance against making deals that freed terrorists, General Lakehal Ayat again challenged the U.S. policy as ill-advised. Algeria’s willingness to negotiate directly with the hijackers, and to push back against a core tenet of U.S. counterterrorism doctrine, highlighted its resolve to follow a different strategic path when confronting hostage crises.

Ambiguity Regarding Hassan Izz-al-Din’s Presence:
Telegram 175 states that a redacted U.S. source positively identified Hasan Izz-al-Din, one of the known hijackers from the 1985 TWA Flight 847 incident, as being involved in the Kuwait Airways hijacking. Securing credible evidence of Izz-al-Din’s presence would have required sophisticated intelligence gathering, potentially involving CIA operatives or advanced signals intelligence. The U.S. sought his extradition given his past acts of terrorism, notably the murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem.

Yet Telegram 176 shows Algerian officials providing conflicting information. After an Algerian negotiator reportedly boarded the aircraft, General Lakehal Ayat informed the U.S. ambassador that there were “no repeat no” terrorists aboard who had participated in the 1985 TWA hijacking. This contradiction cast doubt on the reliability of U.S. intelligence or suggested deliberate obfuscation by Algeria. It also raised the possibility that U.S. accusations were a tactic to force Algerian cooperation. Alternatively, Algeria may have shielded Izz-al-Din to avoid antagonizing Hezbollah or upsetting regional balances. It is also possible the Algerian negotiator genuinely failed to identify him, due to misinformation or the hijackers’ evasiveness. Hichem Aboud, who claimed to have spent time with the hijackers after the hostages’ release, remains one of the few individuals who could confirm Izz-al-Din’s actual presence.

Overly Detailed Questions and the CIA’s Role:

A telegram dated April 23, 1988, from John C. Whitehead (U.S. Deputy Secretary of State) to Ambassador L. Craig Johnstone enumerates a series of highly specific questions meant for General Lakhal Ayat. These queries sought clarity on arrangements for releasing both hostages and hijackers, the hijackers’ identities and whereabouts, and Iran’s possible involvement. The precision and granularity of these questions match Hichem Aboud’s account that the CIA Chief of Station in Algeria posed similarly detailed inquiries.

Aboud recounts that these intrusive questions were perceived by Hadj Mohammed Tahar as both insulting and indicative of subservience. Initially, Tahar refused to answer, later offering only vague responses after General Lakhal Ayat instructed him not to reveal too many specifics. The archival evidence supports Aboud’s version of events, confirming that U.S. officials demanded meticulous information and that Algerian counterparts strategically withheld it.

Retired Colonel Hadj Mohamed Tahar Abdesslam

Tracking the Hijackers’ Whereabouts: Secrecy and Conflicting Accounts

Telegram 2385 from Algiers (April 23, 1988) documents a conversation between Ambassador Johnstone and General Belkheir, who denied knowing the hijackers’ location and deflected responsibility to General Lakhal Ayat. According to Aboud, only a select few Algerian officials knew that the hijackers were secretly held in a villa in Saint Eugène, Algiers. Individuals such as Commander Mohammed Tahar Abdesslam, Smail, and General Ayat purportedly engaged with the hijackers there, assessing their motives and orchestrating a plan to transfer them to Lebanon around ten days before Ramadan’s end.

Media coverage at the time revealed conflicting narratives. Le Monde (April 20 1988) reported that the hijackers had quietly exited the aircraft before the remaining passengers disembarked, noting suspicious occurrences, floodlights suddenly turned off due to a “technical incident,” and the presence of Mohammed Tahar, an Algerian intelligence specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, boarding the plane at 2:30 a.m. Diplomatic sources cited by Le Monde suggested Algeria allowed the hijackers to leave freely, drawing parallels with the 1975 disappearance of the notorious terrorist “Carlos” from the same airport.

The Washington Post (April 20 1988) mentioned that a Soviet-built Antonov transport plane, operated by the Algerian Air Force, departed shortly after the hijackers left the Kuwaiti aircraft. This sparked speculation that the hijackers were flown to Beirut or Tehran as part of the resolution. Other accounts suggested they might still have been in Algeria. Interior Minister Hedi Khediri declined to clarify their whereabouts or comment on the plane’s departure.

The New York Times (April 21 1988) also theorized that the hijackers were flown out aboard the Algerian military transport, citing Kuwaiti press agency claims that Beirut or Tehran were likely destinations. The newspaper noted that there was “no indication” of the hijackers’ arrival in Lebanon and quoted Khediri’s refusal to disclose details, stating only that Kuwait had given full consent. The conflicting reporting, combined with Algerian officials’ evasiveness, depicted a deliberate and carefully managed ambiguity. Algeria’s secrecy, supported by Aboud’s account of a covert villa in Saint Eugène, suggests a meticulously planned effort to handle the crisis in a manner that would minimize direct confrontation and maintain plausible deniability.

The front page of the New York Times, April 21, 1988, Section A, Page 1, headline:
“Algeria Apparently Let Hijackers Trade Hostages for Safe Passage”

On the Risk Taken by Hichem Aboud Accompanying the Hijackers

Telegram exchanges highlight the United States’ profound concern that the hijackers might evade justice. Washington explicitly warned Algeria against any agreement that granted them freedom, arguing that doing so would embolden future hijackers and threaten international security. Aboud’s role, facilitating the hijackers’ departure using false identities and diplomatic passports, took place under the watchful eye of U.S. intelligence and diplomatic pressure, placing him in a highly perilous position.

Diplomatic Telegram in which the US Government intends to use all available means to monitor the situation, and all available means to arrest the hijackers. The U.S. government is also demanding accountability and explanations of the “why” contradictions in the accounts of Lakehal Ayat and Larbi Belkheir.

Aboud’s private conversation with Hadj Tahar Abdesslam about the potential catastrophic fallout if discovered, and Whitehead’s warning to Hamdani on May 10, 1988 that “freedom for hijackers is not a solution,” reflect the precarious balance Aboud and Algeria tried to maintain. Should Algeria’s covert scheme have failed, the diplomatic and personal repercussions would have been severe. By operating in defiance of explicit U.S. admonitions, Algeria and Aboud accepted significant risks to protect their immediate priorities.

The archives confirm this tense backdrop, validating Aboud’s accounts of covert operations and underscoring the high-stakes environment in which these decisions were made. In a volatile international context, Algeria’s approach, facilitating the hijackers’ escape, prioritizing hostages’ safety, resisting U.S. demands, and employing selective transparency, demonstrated both strategic calculation and a willingness to challenge American expectations. Aboud’s claims, confirmed by these recently declassified records, encapsulate the delicate and dangerous maneuvers undertaken to realize Algeria’s objectives amid intense global scrutiny.

Moreover, the newly released U.S. diplomatic cables provide more than just confirmation of Aboud’s firsthand account; they offer a fuller understanding of how Algeria navigated its complex political landscape under extraordinary American pressure. By substantiating Aboud’s claims, these documents illuminate the covert negotiations and calculated compromises that ultimately secured the hostages’ release. In doing so, they reveal the intricate interplay of international interests and regional considerations that lay at the heart of this historic crisis.