Guide for DGSN, DRS and DCSA: How to leak documents and expose the military regime in Algiers

A memorandum leaked on December 12, 2024 by Amir Boukhors, shed light on an awareness campaign targeting social media use among the Algerian Police (DGSN). The DGSN issued a directive mandating awareness sessions on the “random use of social media,” framing it as a threat to professional duty, confidentiality, and institutional reputation. The directive targets legal misuse of social media, risks of document theft, hacking, and misinformation “fake news”, as well as disciplinary measures for violating confidentiality and professional conduct.
The document required the attendance of officers in formal sessions to “sensitize” them against the dangers of social media use. Warnings about technical risks, such as suspicious apps, and alleged attempts to “tarnish” the institution’s image. A clear emphasis on punishment for breaches of confidentiality. The central message is one of control, restriction, and suppression of officers’ communication on digital platforms.

However, this document shows exactly the systematic inefficiency crippling the Algerian system: by automatically assuming police officers are inherently untrustworthy, the directive damages morale and breeds resentment, it fails at building trust and fails showing police officers at being trustworthy by their organization and leadership. What DGSN leadership can’t understand is that trust cannot be built through intimidation and fear.
The memorandum also shows how blind the police are, at addressing the root problems of the leaks. Leaks to Hichem Aboud, Anouar Malek, and Amir Boukhors, are not isolated cases of rogue undisciplined police officers, they are a systemic symptom of a systemic disease and cancerous final stage system. Corruption, abuse of power, and inefficiency do not disappear by silencing grievances, they will grow further and escalate when ignored.

This memorandum, shows also an amateurish lack of understanding of modern means and realities: officers will not stop communicating; they will turn to anonymous tools like Tor, Session, and encrypted apps, beyond the reach of institutional oversight. The DGSN nor the military have the means to break in these systems, because they are technically built in a systemic way to function in “nodes”. Only a global telecom superpower such as China or the USA have the means to access them, because they can run part of those nodes, eventually being able to reverse, decrypt, eavesdrop, and even then, it’s hard to decrypt and takes time.

Excessive secrecy about institutions supposed to foster protection, justice and equality, creates suspicion. Overly emphasizing on “fake news” and leaks only amplifies public curiosity about what is being hidden inside these organizations.

Here is a message to the DGSN and to the other Algerian security agencies: the more the institution clamps down on communication, the more it encourages leaks. Officers who feel unheard or oppressed will continue leaking, and there is no way to stop that, but to engage in a systemic reform and reversal, before a system collapse will happen as it happened in Syria. Those same individuals inside the organizations leaking know by themselves who are the corrupt individuals, and who are not the corrupt individuals.

This possible reform however, which we believe is unlikely to happen due to the advanced stage of hijacked and captured state and thug state level Algerian state has reached. As stated in previous investigations, Individuals responsible for this “state capture” and “state hijacking”, converting Algeria into a “thug state” and a “terror counter-revolution state” using “defensive terrorism” as its last resort policy. Individuals responsible for this are: Mohamed Mediene, Said Chengriha, Abdelkader Haddad, Hamid Oublaïd, Djebbar Mehenna, Chafik Mesbah, Lotfi Nezzar, Mahrez Djeribi. We are listing their names, and will add more as our investigations advance, for the public opinion to know who they are.

The 8 faces of the military regime of algiers or the “système”: Mohamed Mediene, Said Chengriha, Abdelkader Haddad, Hamid Oubelaïd, Djebbar Mehenna, Mahrez Djeribi, Chafik Mesbah, Lotfi Nezzar.

​​Officers who feel unheard or oppressed will, share grievances through anonymous platforms (Tor, Sessions) to independent journalists who are not controlled by the military regime of algiers, at this stage our analysis has led to credibly say that: Hichem Aboud, Anouar Malek, Amir Boukhors, are reliable and credible. They conduct professional and thorough human rights advocate, civil state advocacy, investigative journalism, and constructive criticism, and whistleblowing. We alert the readership from fake critics who have been sent as moles to deflect criticism or tamper criticism against the military regime (in particular against Mohamed Mediene, Said Chengriha, Abdelkader Haddad, Hamid Oublaïd, Djebbar Mehenna, Mahrez Djiribi, Chafik Mesbah, Lotfi Nezzar) and target criticism only to the Presidential civilian side (Abdelmadjid Tebboune, Boualem Boualem, Nadir Laarbaoui, etc.) who despite being corrupt, illegitimate, and inefficient is itself a hostage of the military regime and is a puppet of it. The propagandists mislead and confuse and disorientate Algerian mainstream opinion, and more dangerously: act as informants and inform the military regime of algiers on who are the leaks from inside the regime, trap the opponents in exile to be deported back to algeria (as Mohamed Larbi Zitout trapped and led Mohamed Benhalima, Mohamed Abdallah, Guermit Bounuira to be deported back), and as is Toufik Bennacer who was silenced and “neutralized” after being in contact with Abdou Semmar (alias Ilyas Aribi), Said Bensidra who uses extortion and blackmail, and Salim Salhi who under a fake opposition TV channel continue maintaining direct contact with the Algerian intelligence apparatus, including Chafik Mesbah, the architect of the Algerian terror counter-revolution policy and Ordonnance n° 21-08 du 8 Juin 2021.

For a reputable DGSN, the leadership must create trusted reporting channels, which barely exist through formal rigid processes. They must establish internal, secure mechanisms for officers to report grievances, misconduct, or corruption without fear of reprisals. However, even if implemented, they will not be efficient in 2024 nor in 2025. They will function only when a culture where dialogue is welcomed, not punished. Officers who feel heard are less likely to seek external platforms, as issues are resolved internally. However, in the current environment, officers know that seeking justice and reporting misconduct in their institution, will be faced with reprisals, including harassment, professional dismissal, or, in extreme cases, forced disappearances and assassinations.

Additionally, Algerian propaganda media operate under strict orders of a corrupt security apparatus. Its primary role is not to inform but to create an alternate reality that shields wrongdoers and misleads the public. Attempts to engage these platforms are futile, as whistleblowers’ voices will be censored or buried, captured by the media and rewritten into controlled misleading and propaganda narratives.

The directive’s from the DGSN leaked by Amir Boukhors, is heavy-handed approach dating from the cold-war era, and reveals the systems own contradictions: it seeks to silence voices in a digital age where secrecy is impossible. The institution’s strength lies not in suppressing communication but in fostering trust, transparency, and accountability, three things the military regime of algiers is not able to provide today nor tomorrow. Institutions that confront problems openly earn public trust and disarm critics. Hiding flaws only fuels suspicion and dissent. Instead of suppressing leaks, address the issues that drive officers to speak out, corruption, abuse, inefficiency, and injustice. But this is not possible, as at this stage individuals such as criticism or tamper criticism against the military regime (in particular against Mohamed Mediene, Said Chengriha, Abdelkader Haddad, Hamid Oublaïd, Djebbar Mehenna, Chafik Mesbah, Lotfi Nezzar, Mahrez Djiribi) use distorted propaganda state media, “defensive terrorism” to keep control of what is left to control, before an inevitable military regime of algiers implosion.

Guide for DGSN, DRS and DCSA: How to safely expose the corruption of the military regime in Algiers, without getting caught.

We advise, the moral, integer, honest officers who wish to use tools to leak, to follow the following recommendations in avoiding identification:

Whistleblowers must avoid regime-affiliated individuals who pose significant risks to their safety. These include:

• Mohamed Larbi Zitout: engaged in theft and extortion, exploiting trust to gain administrative access (e.g., stealing and deleting a YouTube channel). He sold information about whistleblowers and defectors, misleading individuals like Mohammed Abdallah, Mohammed Benhlima, and Guermit Bounuira into the hands of intelligence operatives, resulting in their deportation.
• Abdou Semmar (alias Ilyes Aribi): Evidence shows involvement in financial transactions and coercive practices, including extortion and blackmail, to publish favorable content, suppress critical reporting, and orchestrate targeted smear campaigns for clients like Tahkout and Lotfi Nezzar.
• Saïd Bensdira: Known for a history of extortion and blackmail. He defends war criminals, as evidenced by his association with Khaled Nezzar, and has a documented extortion attempt that ended with the stolen mobile being handed to authorities. He acts as a fake critic while maintaining direct ties to Chafik Mesbah and Toufik’s DRS.
• Salim Salhi: Another regime-connected actor posing as an opposition figure, with a role in misleading and entrapping dissidents.

These individuals maintain direct or indirect ties to the regime, making them dangerous to trust. Contacting them exposes whistleblowers to identification, imprisonment, entrapment, or, if abroad, deportation.

For DGSN and Algerian officers to contact reliable individuals who will not ask about your identity, not ask you for money. They will take the misconduct and corruption documents you leak and will assess them themselves as professional and credible human rights and civil rights advocates, investigative journalists. These individuals are : Hichem Aboud, Anouar Malek, Amir Boukhors. You can also contact them directly without the risk of being exposed, by using an anonymous browser on your computer or phone such as Tor Browser, to ensure that online activities cannot be traced by the military regime of algiers. Session or Signal messenger for encrypted communications. Use secure encrypted email accounts such as Tutanota and Protonmail. Ideally, use Apple products which are more secure, such as Mac computers and iPhone mobile phones. Do not use free VPNs, do not use Windows, do not use work computers.

Par Abderrahmane Fares.