Pedro Canales
To address the increasingly numerous problems on the international stage, there are two methods: referring to the historical reasons advanced by both sides or seeking projects and agreements that make a common future feasible. Any other method is simply a combination of the former. The Western Mediterranean and North Africa are a tangible example of this reality.
In a region as small as North Africa and the southwest of the European continent, there are more problems than countries that make it up. In fact, there is not a single pair of countries that do not have territorial disputes, natural resource conflicts, ethnic, linguistic, social, or familial differences, and sometimes political opposition or rival regimes.
It goes without saying that, from the perspective of each protagonist (we are talking about just a dozen countries on both shores of the Mediterranean), each believes they have historical, legal, and legitimate reasons to defend their stance against the opponent or enemy.
Spain has border disputes with Portugal on the Iberian Peninsula itself (the Olivenza issue) and with the Savage Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, located between the Canary Islands (Spain) and Madeira (Portugal), along with their respective jurisdictional waters. Spain also has maritime delimitation differences with France and Algeria.
However, the most well-known disputes are those between Spain and Morocco, regarding the delimitation of their respective territorial waters in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, as well as the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the adjacent Mediterranean islands and islets.
Continuing with the case of Morocco, in addition to the disputes with Spain, there are others with Mauritania regarding the waters surrounding the city of La Güera (which was part of Spanish Western Sahara and is now the southernmost part of the Moroccan province of Ausserd) and Nuadibú (the commercial capital of Mauritania and a strategic port in the north of the country). Both cities are located one after the other along the narrow peninsula that ends at Cap Blanc, separating the Atlantic from the Bay of Nuadibú, called the Galgo Bay on Spanish nautical charts.
The most famous territorial conflict between Morocco and Algeria, however, concerns first the border demarcation signed by King Hassan II of Morocco and President Chadli Benyedid of Algeria, but not ratified by either Parliament, and therefore not implemented; and secondly, the joint exploitation of the Gara Djebilet iron mines located in the Tindouf region. These border disputes and conflicts of interest between Algiers and Rabat have been prolonged by the Sahara conflict, whose repercussions on the security and stability of the region are well known.
Further to the northeast of North Africa, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are also mired in territorial delimitation issues with serious consequences, although episodic, for relations between neighbors.
Solutions?
A large part of these active or potential problems are inherited from the past, from the relationships between the different countries or from the colonial era; others are the result of hegemonic disputes, regime political differences, or personal ambitions of their leaders.
Is there a solution to resolve these endemic problems? Yes, there is. The solution does not lie in turning to conventions, treaties, agreements, international laws, courts, or third-party positions, but in the convergence of mutual interests for the future.
Spain and Portugal, for example, do not enter into conflict because both countries have a shared interest in joint development, and they respect it. The same goes for France and Spain because both work to ensure that the eastern Cantabrian Sea or the Gulf of Lyon, where their jurisdictional waters overlap, are beneficial for both fishing fleets and resource exploitation.
An example of a converging future and shared mutual interest is the agreement between Morocco and Mauritania, sponsored by the United Arab Emirates, for the development of the common Atlantic façade.
The Tangier-Casablanca-Laayoune-Dakhla-Nuadibú-Nouakchott-Dakar highway; the development and coordination of Morocco’s, Mauritania’s, and Senegal’s ports; the unblocking of the Sahel to the Atlantic via Morocco and Mauritania; and joint green energy projects have been on the agenda for discussion between King Mohamed VI, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, and Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, held recently in Abu Dhabi. Previously, Morocco and Mauritania had agreed on these measures during the visit of the Mauritanian head of state to Rabat shortly before.
Common development and the political and financial commitment to carry it out are the basis for overcoming historical disputes. It is not force, cunning, or the domination of the strong over the weak.
Can this method be applied to the final solution of the Sahara conflict? Yes, just as it can be applied to the latent conflict over Ceuta and Melilla. The foundation is common projects for a shared future. It is certainly a process, but the path must unquestionably be the agreement for development, future political, economic, and structural plans.
That is why, in the case of the Sahara, the extended autonomy proposal made by King Mohamed VI at the UN 18 years ago is the most suitable for resolving the conflict. Algeria does not see it this way, because it bases its foreign policy on military force and the financial capacity to sustain a guerrilla, that of the Polisario Front, whose hallmark is victory through arms. An Algerian diplomacy supported by the inexhaustible source of foreign currency that comes from the sale of hydrocarbons on the global market. The same political method based on force that it applies in the Sahel, Libya, France, or Spain.
The signs of implosion in Algeria are not the result of popular protests and mobilizations, nor of alternatives from a muzzled political opposition, nor of the lack of resources to sustain the welfare state that cures social ills with financial injections. No. The discontent among the youth, the concern within the National People’s Army, the disenchantment of intellectuals with the failed national project, and the deep rejection of the arrogance of the regime that has reneged on the values of anti-colonial struggle are factors of a potential implosion that is increasingly likely.