DGSI, DNRT: The Algiers Military Regime in the crosshairs of French Domestic Intelligence
No, this is not a false-flag operation or an unfounded rumor. And this time, the French intelligence services are not holding back. The French press, intelligence agencies, and the Ministry of the Interior are stating it loudly and clearly and fully assuming it: marked by structural reforms, unprecedented inter-agency collaborations, and an unparalleled liberalization of access to sensitive data, French intelligence has launched a counter-offensive targeting the clandestine activities of the Algerian military regime on French soil.
As we announced on November 26, 2024, in our article, major structural changes are underway to strengthen the fight against Algerian interference. Among these measures are the facilitation of access to documents for investigative journalists, increased coordination between intelligence services, the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office, and the Anti-Corruption Agency, the strengthening of criminal intelligence and designating the Anti-Narcotics Office as the leader in intelligence on organized crime, as well as the creation of the National Prosecutor’s Office for the Fight against Organized Crime. The latter integrates the big data tools of the General Directorate of Internal Security (DGSI), initially designed for anti-terrorism investigations. These tools now allow judges and investigators to access complex data directly. The collected evidence could not only facilitate prosecutions but also be made public through the media. In the Senate, it is the Law Commission that is opening the door to simplified access for “second circle” services to criminal intelligence (police, gendarmerie, administrations, etc.) collected by “first circle” agencies (DGSE, DGSI, DNRED, etc.). This decision marks a significant expansion of information sharing between the main intelligence agencies and other law enforcement services. Now, agencies beyond the first circle intelligence organizations can more easily obtain information that was previously difficult to access. This enhanced collaboration aims for better coordination between the different services in the fight against crime and the protection of French national security.
After L’Express revealed that Mehdi Ghezzar was being monitored by the DGSI, on January 25, 2025 the Journal du Dimanche (JDD) published details of a confidential memo from the Direction nationale du renseignement territorial (DNRT): the “aggressive influence strategy” deployed by Algiers on French soil since 2019. In this document, Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s arrival in power marked a turning point: Algerian emissaries, identified as early as 2020, have multiplied lobbying, disinformation and institutional infiltration operations.
The DNRT, a service created in 2023 to monitor unconstitutional threats, reveals methods borrowed from KGB manuals known as “capture and conversion.” Institutional infiltration is one such method: from municipal officials to departmental councils of the Order of Physicians, networks close to Algiers seek to “embed themselves deeply,” according to Dr. Rachid Agoudjil, president of the Coordination of Algerian Elites, during a public statement on Algerian television. Memory manipulation is also used: the restitution of objects belonging to Emir Abdelkader or the comparison between Western Sahara and Palestine aim to exacerbate communal divides. Finally, controlling the diaspora is another strategy deployed by the regime. The failure of the National Observatory of Civil Society (ONSC), with three deputies close to the opposition elected in 2021, greatly displeased Algiers. The regime now relies on associative networks, such as the Dynamic Movement of Algerians in France (Moudaf) led by Nasser Khabat (a close associate of Karim Zeribi), and on more influential figures such as Chems-Eddine Hafiz, coordinator of Tebboune’s 2024 campaign in France.
Facing the methodical influence offensive of the Algerian regime, France has chosen to retaliate by betting on aggressive transparency and a radical modernization of its anti-interference arsenal. By liberalizing access to sensitive intelligence for judges, the media, and “second circle” services, the French state is not only unmasking Algiers’ networks but depriving them of the shadows they need to operate. The DNRT’s revelations on KGB-inspired infiltration tactics, combined with the centralization of criminal data and the media exposure of evidence, now place the Algerian regime under the spotlight. Given the amateurism of its proxies, Algiers sees its levers of influence shrinking dramatically. It remains to be seen whether this counter-attack by French intelligence will mark the end of the era of clandestine interferences—even the fall of the Algerian military regime, as Judge Marc Trevidic has wished, or if it will merely serve as a wake-up call to highlight its fragility and incite it to embark on de-escalation.
Abderrahmane Fares
